Technical methods and scope

AI Security Risks in Production Deployments

An AI application's behavior depends on its training, its system prompt, the retrieval context, its tool integrations and the conversation history. Testing asks how an attacker could influence each of those inputs and whether the application around the model would then permit a disclosure or an unauthorized action. Beyond the prompt a user types, retrieval can carry instructions inside documents, database records and web pages, an agent can meet them while browsing, reading email or processing an upload, and pipelines that chain several models add boundaries where one model's output becomes another's input.

A disclosed system prompt is a security finding when it reveals real secrets, sensitive data or a broken control; disclosure of behavioral instructions alone is a lesser issue, and we tell you which one you have. Authorization and secret handling belong outside the model, so we judge observed data access and actions against the approved boundary rather than against what the prompt asked the model to do.

OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications as a Test Map

The 2025 OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications names ten classes of failure, and we use it as a map so every class has a place in the scope: prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, supply chain weaknesses, data and model poisoning, improper output handling, excessive agency, system prompt leakage, vector and embedding weaknesses, misinformation and unbounded consumption.

For each class we test what your deployment exposes. Injection findings distinguish what the model said from what data or action was demonstrated. Output handling tests follow model responses into SQL, shell, HTML or API calls. Agency tests check least privilege and whether a human approval stands in front of consequential operations. Retrieval tests probe namespace separation behind the index, and consumption tests stay within approved token, request and spending limits. Background reading: the OWASP entry on system prompt leakage and NIST AI 100-2 E2025, Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations.

Tell us which systems matter most and we will sequence the testing around them.

The Attack Paths We Run

Scoping maps the model, prompt structure, tool and API connections, the data sources feeding inference, chained pipelines and user access; for a retrieval application we add the vector database settings and ingestion, and for an agent the catalog of tools, permissions and approval workflows. We confirm the tools, the scenario set, the specialists and the validation protocol before testing starts, and every tested input is recorded so coverage can be inspected rather than taken on trust.

The manual phase builds scenarios for your domain, users and connected tools: permitted call sequences that combine into an unauthorized outcome, indirect injection through uploads, retrieved web content and email, queries that reach another user's namespace, and guardrail tests using misleading context, plausible framing and changes of format and language.

AI Red Teaming Against Agreed Objectives

An AI red team pursues attacker objectives agreed with you and iterates against the defenses in scope. A public chatbot might face attempts to extract internal data or obtain unauthorized discounts; an internal document assistant might face planted documents from a malicious insider; an agent with code or API access may offer a route to elevated privilege or unauthorized change. We begin with reconnaissance of the model's capabilities, test approved initial access through injection or guardrail bypass and follow the path to the objective, documenting the exact prompts, each response and the observed impact.

Where the scope and qualified specialists make it relevant, robustness testing extends to security classifiers such as content moderation, fraud detection, identity verification and malware detection, using controlled input changes to see whether an adversary could influence the result.